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Abstract: 
Information security compliance behavior research has produced several theoretical models derived from different 
disciplines to explain or predict violations of information security policies (ISP) or related employee intentions. The 
application of these theories to ISP violations has led to an increasing number of information security behavioral models. 
Based on this observation, Moody et al. (2018) reviewed and empirically compared 11 theories that predict information 
system security behavior using a Finnish sample. Drawing on these findings, they derived and tested a unified model 
of ISP compliance (UMISPC). This study is a conceptual replication of the refined UMISPC by Moody et al (2018). For 
the replication, we considered the general tendency to violate policy rather than respondents considering specific 
behaviors according to the scenario approach that Moody et al. (2018) used to test the refined UMISPC. Further, in 
contrast to Moody et al. (2018), we tested the refined UMISPC with respondents from Germany. In our data, we found 
empirical evidence for seven of the eight proposed relationships of the refined UMISPC. Only the relationship between 
fear and reactance remained insignificant in our estimation. Although more research is necessary to confirm our results, 
we interpret them as further support for the model’s generalizability. 
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1 Introduction 
As the relevance of information security in private and professional contexts increases, the risk factors for 
security attacks such as data breaches also increase. One can increasingly see that the human element is 
a critical factor for the success of information security as unsafe employee behavior causes many violations 
and technical measures cannot prevent them alone. In order to establish a starting point for socio-technical 
measures to minimize this risk factor, companies create ISPs that describe compliant and noncompliant 
employee information security behavior (Angst et al., 2017; Gannon, 2013). One topic related to these 
endeavors located in information systems (IS) research is the ISP compliance behavior. Unfortunately, 
research has shown that employees often neglect the appropriate ISP actions prescribed by their respective 
security policies and, for the most part, tend to behave insecurely, even if they are aware of the guidelines 
(Cram et al., 2019; Gwebu et al., 2020). 
Several studies have analyzed this phenomenon from different angles to explain the aspects of individual 
security behavior. Various theories from different disciplines, such as criminology and social psychology, 
have been instantiated and/or modified (e.g., Abraham, 2011; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; D’Arcy and Herath, 
2011; Ifinedo, 2012; Willison and Warkentin, 2013). According to Moody et al. (2018), this has led to “a 
jungle of competing ISP behavior models” that are not easily comparable to one another. For this reason, 
they reviewed and empirically compared 11 theories that predict compliant ISP behavior. Drawing on these 
insights, they empirically developed and validated a unified model of ISP compliance (UMISPC). 
For the validation of the designed UMISPC, Moody et al. (2018) conducted an online survey and obtained 
393 usable responses. Based on the results, they were able to refine their model, called the refined 
UMISPC, and show that it is valid. The model takes into account the similarities and differences of the 
combined 11 theories, thus enabling the integration of various important aspects of different ISP compliance 
behavior models. Further studies with different contextual parameters, such as samples, cross-cultural 
approaches or different security threats, should be conducted to validate universalized models  
(Aurigemma and Mattson, 2019). Thus, a replication study is considered necessary to assess whether the 
UMISPC is stable across cultures, samples, and contexts. 
The aim of this replication study was twofold. First, we followed the idea of a conceptual replication as put 
forth by Dennis and Valacich (2014). The empirically developed scales of the UMISPC are anchored to 
specific scenario behaviors, whereas we used revised scales that assess one’s general tendency to violate 
ISPs. Second, we validated the UMISPC with German respondents as compared to Moody et al’s (2018) 
study, which used respondents from Finland. Hence, our replication provides a test of the UMISPC’s cross-
cultural generalizability. In order to generate a broad sample to test the UMISPC, the surveyed German 
employees include various educational qualifications, as opposed to Moody et al. (2018), who only used 
graduate students. Altogether, we collected and analyzed a data set of 433 German employees. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the development and 
refinement of the UMISPC. In Section 3, we present our methodology, our data collection process, and our 
sample’s properties. In Section 4, we present our findings and compare them with those of the original study.  
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2 Research Model 
Figure 1 presents the research model, pathways and results of Moody et al.’s (2018) UMISPC validation 
study, which served as the basis for the development of the refined UMISPC, which was conceptualized in 
a further step. Table 1 includes the definition of the constructs used to develop the UMISPC. 
 
 
Figure 1. UMISPC Results of the Original Study (Moody et al., 2018). 
 
Table 1. Construct Definitions of the UMISPC (Moody et al., 2018). 
Construct Definition 
Response Efficacy The perceived effectiveness of the behavior in mitigating or avoiding 
the perceived threat 
Threat Perceived severity and susceptibility to a perceived potential harm 
Facilitating Conditions The potential of the individual to comply without help from other people 
Rewards/Costs Positive reinforcement that is perceived when in compliance with the 
ISP 
Punishments Negative reinforcement that is perceived to be imposed if found to be 
noncompliant with the ISP 
Social Factors The summative influence perceived by an individual due to social 
norms, roles within the group, and the individual’s self-concept 
relevant to the group 
Fear Negative emotional response to stimuli 
Neutralization Rationalized thinking that allows one to justify departure from 
compliance intentions 
Habit A regular tendency that does not require conscious thought to be 
compliant with the ISP 
Intention The inclination to engage in a specific behavior 
Reactance Denying that there is an information systems security problem 
 
Moody et al. (2018) were able to provide significant evidence for the intention to comply with ISP and 
demonstrate reactance. They also found that the constructs of neutralization, fear, habit, and role values 
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(referred to as social factors in the original model) are significant predictors of intention and reactance. Their 
results showed that both neutralization and fear significantly predicted reactance. Furthermore, response 
efficacy could predict the perceived threat, which in turn predicted fear. The protective behavioral intentions 
for compliance with ISP were explained by the variables of role values, fear, and habits. The punishments, 
rewards/costs, and facilitation of conditions had no significant impact on intention. 
Moody et al.’s (2018) refined UMISPC (Figure 2) only includes constructs and relationships that were found 
to be significant. In our replication, we examined the refined UMISPC. 
 
 
Figure 2. Refined UMISPC of the Original Study (Moody et al., 2018). 
 
3 Method 
In this study, we measured the UMISPC items in the context of German employees’ ISP compliance 
behavior. We used the same research questions and hypotheses as to the original study (Dennis and 
Valacich, 2014). However, we altered the wording of items used to measure the key constructs of the 
UMISPC in order to generalize each construct’s context. In this case, we considered the directions proposed 
by Moody et al. (2018) to check whether the results in other demographic groups surveyed would lead to 
different results. Thus, we collected data with items similar to those used by Moody et al. (2018) but in a 
generalized form, using a survey approach that was not scenario-based in order to avoid a contextual 
distinction and achieve more general results. A distinction in the modelling of generalizable and context-
specific models to explain behavior is controversial in IS research. On the one hand, existing research 
determines universal relationships that can apply to many information security phenomena that affect 
employee ISP compliance behavior. Universal constructs and relationships, therefore, constitute the starting 
points for future research related to many different information security problems. On the other hand, 
behavior concerning violations of ISPs is often an individual phenomenon, which can vary widely between 
contexts. Factors such as the company’s industry, organizational forms, national culture, or the 
characteristics of the context of an offence can determine the behavior of an employee in each case. The 
use of generalized questions aims to measure general behavior for the review of a universal model such as 
UMISPC. Findings of general behavior about ISP compliance can be used in future research to identify 
specifics of behavior in different contexts (Aurigemma and Mattson, 2019). 
Existing information security behavior research has shown that in some of the models, on which the 
UMISPC is based, ISP conformity is culturally dependent; hence, there is a need to further test such models 
for cultural differences (Hovav and D’Arcy, 2012). German nationality was a criterion for participation in our 
online survey to test the stability of the model and its applicability in a different culture. The participants were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTURK) and Clickworker (CW). Participants were 
remunerated upon completion of the study. We conducted a preselection to ensure that only people who 
were employed at the time and worked with a computer and whose organizations had ISPs in place would 
participate. MTURK and CW are reliable sources of high-quality data and have been used in several areas 
for various research purposes (Lowry et al., 2016; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014). 
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We conducted a priori sample size calculations using Westland’s (2010) formula. It states two lower bounds 
for sample size in structural equation modelling. The first lower bound referred to the minimum sample size 
for model identification and the second lower bound referred to the minimum sample size for adequate 
power to detect an impact. For our calculations, we used the UMISPC as a reference model with eight latent 
variables and 39 observed variables. Moreover, a statistical power level of 0.9, a probability level of 0.05, 
and a medium effect size for structural equation modelling of 0.3 were assumed. For the calculations, we 
used Soper’s (2019) a priori sample size for the structural equation models. The minimum sample sizes for 
model identification and adequate power were 88 and 239, respectively. With 393 participants, Moody et al. 
(2018) were able to meet both criteria. As we aimed to mimic the original study, we recruited 433 participants 
for our replication. 
To validate our questionnaire, we sent it to five academic experts for review. We then started with 86 
participants, obtaining 50 valid and complete questionnaires. As we collected our data from two different 
sources (i.e. two panel providers), it was necessary to show that the same constructs are measured in both 
samples. Accordingly, we tested for configural and metric measurement invariance (Steelman et al., 2014). 
Using the same item configurations, we separately estimated two models. A comparison between the two 
estimations showed no significant differences in the factor loadings and path coefficients. Moreover, the 
interpretation of the results was stable in the two groups. We interpreted this as justification for pooling our 
samples. To conduct a common method bias test, we used the marker variable technique (Lindell and 
Whitney, 2001) and chose the respondent’s outside activities as the theoretically unrelated marker variable 
(D’Arcy and Lowry, 2019). The highest variance that the marker shared with another construct is less than 
0.05. In addition, the path coefficients between the constructs showed no significant size changes (> 0.01). 
Consequently, we found no evidence of common method bias in our study. 
To collect the data from the crowdsourcing platforms mentioned above, we adopted the quality criteria from 
Lowry et al. (2016). Participants were paid $1.65 for successful and conscientious participation in the study. 
In order to ensure that the participation criteria of being currently employed, using a computer at work, and 
working for an organization with an ISP were met, related queries were made before proceeding with the 
actual questionnaire. If the criteria were not met, the questionnaire was cancelled and considered as 
unsuccessful. To check whether the questionnaire was filled conscientiously and ensure that questions were 
not answered randomly, we included questions to which the participant was asked to give a specific answer 
or solve a math problem. In addition, the relative number of possible answers per participant were com-
pared and revised those who the distribution of the results per answer was higher than 50%. To meet the 
quality criteria from Lowry et al. (2016), we conducted a technical preselection on the platforms used, to 
ensure that only participants who were German, and spoke sufficient English to fill the questionnaire and 
whose acceptance rate of previous participation in other jobs was higher than 90% would participate. Table 
2 provides an overview of the samples. 
The resulting sample consisted of 767 respondents. According to our selection criteria, 433 responses were 
classified as valid (validity rate = 57%). The participants mean age was 35-40. The proportion of female 
subjects was 33%, male subjects accounted for 65%, and 2% opted not to share their gender. 
 
Table 2. Demographics of the Samples. 
Variables Original Replication 
Study 1 Study 2 
Sample Size 274 393 433 
Country Finland Finland Germany 
Mean Age Not Published Not Published 35-40 
Sex (Female/Male/Other) Not Published Not Published 33%/65%/2% 
 
Moody et al. (2018) used their first study to test the initially created model and their second study to test the 
results of their refined model. In our replication study, only one survey was necessary, as we only tested 
results of the refined UMISPC. 
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All the participants in the original study had work experience, a master’s degree, or a background in 
education, representing diverse scientific disciplines, such as medicine, natural science, engineering, 
business, social science, and educational sciences. The authors excluded theology, sports science, and 
law. Numerical values pertinent to the statistical representation of the demographic criteria, such as age, 
gender, work experience, and professional background were not provided in the original article. In our 
replication study, we queried these characteristics, which are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Characteristics of the Samples. 
Sector Percentage Job Level Percentage Educational Background Percentage 
Manufacturing  12% Senior Manager  6% High School or equivalent  14% 
Finance  11% Middle Manager  17% Two-Year College or equivalent  13% 
IT  24% Technical Staff  16% Bachelor’s Degree or equivalent  37% 
Healthcare  9% Professional Staff  31% Master’s Degree or equivalent  30% 
Education  8% Administrative  13% Doctoral Degree or equivalent  3% 
Retail  4% Other 17% Other 3% 
Public 
Administration  
9%     
Other 23%     
4 Data Analysis and Results 
For the data analysis, we employed partial least squares estimation using SmartPLS 3.0 software. The 
following subsections present the comparison of our results with those of the original study. 
4.1 Measurement of Constructs 
Table 4 shows the constructs of Moody et al. (2018) and our items, all of which were reformulated according 
to the original items. We carefully reformulated most items as statements to adapt them to a research 
context without an underlying scenario. The items were measured using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
("disagree") to 7 ("fully agree"). 
 
Table 4. Scales and Factor Loadings.  
Factor Items Old Original Item Loadings 
Old 
Rephrased Items 
Rephrased 
Loadings 
New 
Role values role3 What Mattila did can 
be justified due to 
the nature of 
Mattila’s work. 
0.784 Not complying with 
ISP procedures can 
be justified due to the 
nature of my work. 
SF01 0.534 
moral1 How morally wrong 
would it be to do 
what the person did 
in the scenario? 
0.812 Not complying with 
ISP procedures 
would be morally 
wrong. 
SF02 0.407 
affect1 What Mattila did is 
smart. 
0.911 Not complying with 
ISP procedures is 
smart. 
SF03 0.849 
affect4 What Mattila did is 
pleasant. 
0.786 Not complying with 
ISP procedures is 
pleasant. 
SF04 0.788 
selfcon1 I would feel guilty if I 
did what Mattila did. 
0.889 I would feel guilty if I 
do not comply with 
ISP procedures. 
SF05 0.369 
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Table 4. Scales and Factor Loadings.  
selfcon2 What Mattila did is 
consistent with my 
principles. 
0.752 Not complying with 
ISP procedures is 
consistent with my 
principles. 
SF06 0.816 
selfcon3 It is acceptable to do 
what Mattila did. 
0.833 Not complying with 
ISP procedures is 
acceptable. 
SF07 0.828 
percbehcont2 If you were Mattila, 
how much would you 
feel able to not do as 
he did? 
0.866 I would feel able to 
not comply with the 
ISP procedures. 
SF08 0.577 
Habit habit1 Not complying with 
information security 
procedures saves 
work time. 
0.785 Not complying with 
information security 
procedures saves 
work time. 
HAB01 0.739 
habit2 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I do 
frequently. 
0.800 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I do 
frequently. 
HAB02 0.840 
habit3 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I do 
automatically. 
0.762 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I do 
automatically. 
HAB03 0.863 
habit5 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I do 
without having to 
consciously 
remember. 
0.849 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I do 
without having to 
consciously 
remember. 
HAB04 0.747 
habit7 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I do 
without thinking. 
0.799 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I do 
without thinking. 
HAB05 0.855 
habit8 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something that 
belongs to my (daily, 
weekly, monthly) 
routine. 
0.783 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something that 
belongs to my (daily, 
weekly, monthly) 
routine. 
HAB06 0.749 
habit11 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I start 
doing before I realize 
I’m doing it. 
0.862 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I start 
doing before I realize 
I’m doing it. 
HAB07 0.592 
habit12 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something that’s 
typically “me.” 
0.847 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something that’s 
typically “me.” 
HAB08 0.805 
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Table 4. Scales and Factor Loadings.  
Neutralization neutcond3 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I have 
been doing for a long 
time. 
0.791 Complying with 
information security 
procedures is 
something I have 
been doing for a long 
time. 
NEU01 0.878 
neutloyal1 It is not as wrong to 
violate company 
information security 
procedures that are 
too restrictive. 
0.916 It is not as wrong to 
violate company 
information security 
procedures that are 
too restrictive. 
NEU02 0.910 
neutinjury3 It is alright to violate 
company information 
security procedures 
to get a job done. 
0.811 It is alright to violate 
company information 
security procedures 
to get a job done. 
NEU03 0.896 
 vulner1 It is OK to violate 
company information 
security procedures 
if no one gets hurt. 
0.884 It is OK to violate 
company information 
security procedures if 
no one gets hurt. 
THR01 0.769 
vulner2 I would be subjected 
to an information 
security threat if I 
were to do what 
Mattila did. 
0.894 I would be subjected 
to an information 
security threat if I do 
not comply with the 
ISP procedures. 
THR02 0.822 
vulner3 My organization 
would be subjected 
to an information 
security threat if I 
were to do what 
Mattila did. 
0.908 My organization 
would be subjected 
to an information 
security threat if I do 
not comply with ISP 
procedures. 
THR03 0.826 
sever3 An information 
security problem 
would occur if I were 
to do what Mattila 
did. 
0.854 An information 
security problem 
would occur if I do 
not comply with ISP 
procedures. 
THR04 0.797 
Fear fear7 If I were to do what 
Mattila did, there 
would be a serious 
information security 
problem for my 
organization. 
0.858 If I do not comply with 
the ISP procedures, 
there would be a 
serious information 
security problem for 
my organization. 
FEAR01 0.878 
fear10 My computer might 
be compromised if I 
did what Mattila did. 
0.969 If I do not comply with 
the ISP procedures, 
my computer might 
be compromised. 
FEAR02 0.848 
fear11 My computer might 
become unusable if I 
did what Mattila did. 
0.943 If I do not comply with 
the ISP procedures, 
my computer might 
become unusable. 
FEAR03 0.702 
Response 
Efficacy 
respeff2 My computer might 
become slower if I 
did what Mattila did. 
0.836 If I do not comply with 
the ISP procedures, 
my computer might 
become slower. 
REF02 0.881 
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Table 4. Scales and Factor Loadings.  
respeff3 Complying with 
information security 
procedures in our 
organization keeps 
information security 
breaches down. 
0.861 Complying with 
information security 
procedures in our 
organization keeps 
information security 
breaches down. 
REF03 0.891 
respeff4 If I were to comply 
with information 
security procedures, 
IS security breaches 
would be scarce. 
0.861 If I were to comply 
with ISP procedures, 
IS security breaches 
would be scarce. 
REF04 0.832 
Reactance react3 I need more 
guidance from my 
superiors with work-
related information 
security policies. 
0.842 I need more 
guidance from my 
superiors with work-
related information 
security policies. 
REA01 0.949 
react4 I need more 
guidance from the 
IT/information 
security personnel 
regarding 
information security 
issues related to my 
work. 
0.994 I need more 
guidance from the 
IT/information 
security personnel 
regarding information 
security issues 
related to my work. 
REA02 0.956 
Intention  
to Comply 
NA What is the chance 
that you would do 
what Mattila did in 
the described 
scenario? 
0.958 I feel that problems 
resulting from 
violating ISP 
procedures are overly 
exaggerated. 
ISPINT01 0.921 
NA I would act in the 
same way as Mattila 
did if I were in the 
same situation. 
0.982 I think that problems 
resulting from 
violating ISP 
procedures are 
overstated. 
ISPINT02 0.906 
NA / NA I intend to carry out 
my responsibilities 
prescribed in the ISP 
procedures of my 
organization when I 
use information and 
technology in the 
future. 
ISPINT03 0.910 
 
4.2 Measurement Validation 
We investigated the measurement model in terms of indicator reliability, internal consistency, convergent 
validity, and discriminant validity. Regarding indicator reliability (Hulland, 1999), we find five items that do 
not meet the required threshold of 0.7 (see Table 4) and were thus excluded from our model. Afterwards, 
all indicators had high-standardized loadings on their respective constructs. As a measure of internal 
consistency, we calculated composite reliabilities (Table 6). All composite reliabilities clearly exceed the 
threshold of 0.7 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988). We also confirmed convergent validity, as the average variance 
extracted (AVE) of each construct was above 0.5 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). To assess discriminatory validity 
(Table 5), we followed Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) criterion and compared the square root of the AVEs with 
the inter-construct correlations. The comparison showed that each construct had a lower correlation value 
with other constructs than the square root of the AVE (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Accordingly, discriminant 
validity was confirmed. 
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Table 5. Inter-Construct Correlations. 
Variable Intention Reactance Fear Threat Habit Neutra-
lization 
Role value Response 
efficacy 
Intention .957        
Reactance .425 .901        
Fear -.382 -.304 .921      
Threat -.438  -.454 .635 .923     
Habit -.435 -.226 .175 .279 .853    
Neutra-
lization 
-675 .544 -.294 -.443 -.410 .866   
Role value .833 .438 -.264 -.393 -.370 .655 .872  
Response 
efficacy 
-.238 -.255 .230 .341 .252 -.223 -.205 .883 
Descriptive statistics of the original study. The diagonal represents the square root of the averaged variance 
extracted (AVE) for the respective construct. 
Variable Intention Reactance Fear Threat Habit Neutra-
lization 
Role value Response 
efficacy 
Intention .912        
Reactance -.392 .953       
Fear .187 .040 .813      
Threat .450 -.191 .489 .804     
Habit .619 -.260 .200 .443 .810    
Neutra-
lization 
-.506 .608 .002 -.215 -.386 .895   
Role value .542 -.531 -.004 .206 .401 -.634 .862  
Response 
efficacy 
.295 -.030 .300 .326 .297 -.086 .155 .868 
Descriptive statistics of the replication study. The diagonal represents the square root of the averaged variance 
extracted (AVE) for the respective construct. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Construct Reliability 
Variable Original Study Replication 
Mean Std Dev CR Mean Std Dev CR AVE 
(1) Intention -.024 2.984 .9783 5.616 1.179 .9372 .8326 
(2) Reactance -.014 1.306 .9095 3.601 1.431 .9514 .9074 
(3) Fear -.001 1.842 .9351 4.517 1.256 .8528 .6609 
(4) Threat -.009 1.469 .9332 4.548 1.107 .8795 .6461 
(6) Habit .004 .653 .9067 5.161 1.158 .9299 .6555 
(7) Neutra- 
lization 
.025 1.836 .8871 3.052 1.459 .9235 .8010 
(8) Role value .007 1.571 .8975 4.959 1.410 .9204 .7432 
(11) Response 
efficacy 
-.002 1.249 * 4.587 1.247 .9019 .7541 
In our replication of the study, we calculated the mean and standard deviation of the unstandardized variables, which 
were measured on a scale of 1-7. 
* Not reported in the original study. 
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4.3 Structural Model 
We used the PLS method to estimate the refined model. To assess the significance of the paths, we used 
the bootstrapping resampling method with 3,000 samples. The results and significance are shown in the 
respective paths in Figure 3. The significant paths were found to be similar to those of Moody et al. (2018). 
The only non-significant pathway in our estimation that shows significance in the refined UMISPC was the 
pathway between fear and reactance. In summary, we can conclude that response efficacy (0.325; 
significant at 0.01) has a significant positive associated with threat. Threat (0.489; significant at 0.01), in 
turn, was a significant positive predictor on fear. Fear (0.039) had no significant association with other 
variables. Neutralization (0.608; significant at 0.01) was significant positive associated on reactance. Habit 
(0.455; significant at 0.01), role values (0.360; significant at 0.01), and fear (0.098; significant at 0.01) were 
a significant positive predictor of intention. The R2 of the dependent variable threat was 10.6%, of fear 
23.9%, of reactance 37.1%, and of intention 49.5%. Per the original paper, we conclude that the refined 
UMISPC worked with our sample in all respects except for the path between fear and reactance. 
 
 
Figure 3. UMISPC Results of the Replication Study. 
 
Table 7. Comparison of the path coefficients and R2. 
Path 
Comparison of Path Coefficients 
Original Study Replication Study 
Response Efficacy --> Threat .333*** .325*** 
Threat --> Fear .591*** .489*** 
Habit --> Intention -.144*** .455*** 
Social Factors --> Intention .773*** .360*** 
Fear --> Intention -.289*** .098*** 
Fear --> Reactance .250*** .039 
Neutralization --> Reactance .493*** .061*** 
Construct 
Comparison of R2 
Original Study Replication Study 
Threat .111 .106 
Fear .350 .239 
Intention .677 .495 
Reactance .295 .371 
*Note: The model of the original study contains further variables (facilitating conditions, rewards/costs, punishment), which were not considered in the 
measurement of the replication study. 
Intention
R2 = 0.495
Habit
Reactance
R2 = 0.371
Neutralization
Fear
R2 = 0.239
Social Factors
Threat
R2 = 0.106
Response 
Efficacy
.325***
.489***
.608***
.455***
.360***
.039
.098***
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Table 7 shows a comparison between the path coefficients and the R2 from the structural models of the 
original and replication study. The comparison revealed both similarities and differences of the relationships 
between the model’s independent and dependent variables. While the influence of response efficacy on 
threat and of threat on fear are similar in both studies, apparent differences can be observed in other 
associations. The relationship between social factors on employee’s intention was stronger by 0.413 in the 
original study. The impact of neutralization on reactance was also higher in the replication study (0.4322) 
than in the original study. The influence of fear on reactance was not very different, although the declared 
variance in the original study was at a significant level, which was not the case in the replication study. Also, 
whereas in the original study, habit and fear were positive predictors of intention, they had a negative 
influence in the replication study.  
In closing, with regard to the R2, it can be stated that in the replications study, these are lower for all 
constructs except for reactance. Here the R2 of the replication study is 37.1% and of the original study 
29.5%. 
5 Discussion 
Replication studies are valuable because they enable information security researchers to validate existing 
models and understand the phenomenon in new contexts (Dennis and Valacich, 2014). This study fulfils the 
primary objective of a replication study by replicating the refined UMISPC by Moody et al. (2018) in a new 
context. Furthermore, this work builds on their results by moving away from the original scenarios (USB 
drive usage, workstation logoff, and password misuse) and applying a generalized, statement-based 
approach to the description of information security compliance mechanisms in behavioral ISP research. The 
results of our replication study confirm the stability of some of the model’s constructs, extending our 
knowledge about their stability and applicability in a general ISP behavior context. 
Moody et al. (2018) developed a robust model that combines various models from previous behavioral ISP 
research and tested it in the context of USB drive abuse, password misuse, and failure to log off 
workstations. Furthermore, they suggested four directions for future research: The first is testing the 
UMISPC in different contexts to determine its boundaries and identify situations in which the model’s 
components fail to explain the phenomenon analyzed. In our replication, we stepped away from the three 
contexts initially used, relying on a generic approach to explain the mechanisms considered in the model. 
Our results show different significances of the constructs, especially regarding fear and habit in association 
with intention. This supports the view that contextual differences such as cultures, must be taken into 
account when creating universal models and measuring ISP compliance behavior (Aurigemma and Mattson, 
2019; Trang, 2018). We can conclude that the association of the fear and habit constructs with the intention 
in the German cultural context are different from in the Finnish one. On the other hand, we show that the 
relationships of other constructs, such as the association of response efficacy with fear and of fear with 
threat are relatively stable across cultures and a generalized operationalization of the constructs. 
The second aim of future research suggested by the authors of the original study is to extend the research 
stream around the UMISPC by adding additional constructs and moderators in different contexts. We 
addressed this by using the same model constructs but without adopting a scenario-based approach to 
collect the data. Instead of the scenarios for measuring intention, we used the constructs proposed by 
Bulgurcu (2010), which are widely used in the field (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010; Ifinedo, 2012). This 
helped us determine whether context characteristics rather than various insecure behaviors, such as misuse 
of passwords, USB drive abuses, or forgetting to log off influence the model’s results (Siponen and Vance, 
2014). We studied the refined UMISPC model, which was not empirically tested in the original study and 
was indicated by the authors as a potential object of future research. We found several significances. It was 
found that response efficacy was a positive predictor of threat. The constructs habit, social factors, and fear 
were significant positive predictors of the intention to behave compliantly, and neutralization affects 
reactance in our sample (see Figure 3). 
The third suggestion from Moody et al. (2018) is to examine whether certain constructs of the UMISPC may 
not be relevant in different ISP compliance behavior contexts. Indeed, we found differences between the 
results of the original study and those of our study. Based on our results and their comparison with those of 
the original study, the further scope for future research can be identified. First, our study offers an approach 
without contextual references. As also indicated by Moody et al. (2018), the model should be tested in more 
contexts in order to determine the usability of its constructs in the various areas of information security. 
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Second, other demographic differences, such as different national cultures of participants or a comparison 
on a national, cross-cultural level can also be considered in more detail (Hovav and D’Arcy, 2012). 
6 Limitations 
There is a notable difference between the data sets being used in the original study and those in our 
replication study. The original study recruited participants using a database that contained former M.A. 
students from the universities of the authors which they are currently researching with, whereas this study 
recruited participants using the crowdsourcing platforms MTURK and CW. Our data set differs in terms of 
the participants’ origin and educational background. Differences in the participants’ demographics could not 
be included in the comparison between the two studies. Moreover, statements about causal relationships 
presented in this model should be tested in future research on various populations in order to present 
generally applicable results. As we increased the level of variation in terms of educational background in 
our sample but did not make direct comparisons to the original study, a distinction and comparison of 
different educational backgrounds might be interesting. Although it is widely practiced in IS research, 
collecting empirical data through MTURK is sometimes criticized for carrying a risk in terms of verifying the 
accuracy of statements or a wide diversity of queried organizations (Lowry et al., 2016). Our replication 
should be interpreted in light of these limitations. Future replication studies should validate our findings using 
other panels. 
7 Conclusion 
This study draws on the findings of Moody et al. (2018) by conducting a conceptual replication of the original 
research model. We tested the refined UMISPC in a different context, then collected and analyzed 433 
responses from German employees. Our measurement models display reliable measurement properties. 
We provide empirical evidence for seven of the eight proposed relationships of the refined UMISPC. Our 
results address the scope for future research that were identified in connection with the UMISPC model. 
Therefore, we used a non-scenario based, contextualized, and generalized approach for the empirical 
validation of the model, thus examining its applicability from a different perspective. In addition, other items 
were used to measure intention, which meets the need to use other contexts in the model, according to 
Moody et al. (2018). As previously discussed, stable relationships but also variations in the results were 
found. Specifically, these differences should be analyzed by further studies. Furthermore, future research 
could continue this approach and empirically validate the model from other perspectives. Possible 
approaches include comparing further cultural differences in the data set using contexts different from those 
in the original model or our generalized approach and including other demographic variables that have not 
yet been considered. 
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